PoC: how the eMudhra/emSign weak CA-key compromise (Oct 2026) MITMs systems with stale trust stores — lab-only, throwaway keys
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Updated
Oct 25, 2026 - Python
PoC: how the eMudhra/emSign weak CA-key compromise (Oct 2026) MITMs systems with stale trust stores — lab-only, throwaway keys
macOS: remove the blocked eMudhra/AAA root keys from /etc/ssl/cert.pem (the CA file the built-in curl trusts). Run once or push via MDM.
Detect and deny the 8 compromised eMudhra/emSign G3 intermediate CAs (Mozilla Bug 2083449). Public certs + fingerprints + Suricata rules + trust-store distrust tooling. No private keys.
Local reproduction of the Oct 2026 eMudhra/emSign intermediate-CA compromise + differential trust-store tests across 6 clients.
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