The latest tagged release is supported. Fixes land on main and ship in the next
v<YEAR>.<ISO week>.<patch> tag; older releases are not patched separately.
Report privately, not in a public issue:
- Use GitHub's private vulnerability report (Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability).
- Or email nugraha07rizki@gmail.com.
Include the version, platform, the impact you observed, and steps to reproduce. A proof of concept helps but is not required. Reports are acknowledged and handled with a fix and a coordinated advisory before details are published.
In scope: qd, quicdropd, qd-core (protocol, discovery, sender, receiver), the desktop
app under apps/desktop, and the packaging in packaging/.
Useful to report:
- A peer causing a crash, unbounded memory or disk use, or a path escape outside the receive directory.
- Bypassing the receive-side approval, resume offsets, or certificate pinning.
- Reaching the
quicdropdloopback API without its bearer token. - Leaking
identity.keyor the daemon token to another local user.
These are documented behaviour, not vulnerabilities on their own:
- The receiver does not authenticate the sender's certificate. A trusted device id is scoped to the channel the user approved, not to a signed long-term identity.
- mDNS and the UDP beacon are unauthenticated; peers found that way are only shortcuts to an address that still has to complete the handshake.
- Sending by raw address skips certificate pinning by design.
Vulnerabilities in third-party crates should go to the upstream project. We track them through Dependabot.