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feat(approach): Private Registry - #219

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Darkjay123:approach-private-registry

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Fills the "Approach TBD" gap on the Private Registry use case from issue #138.

What this adds

New approach card Private Registry (approaches/approach-private-registry.md) comparing three sub-approaches:

  • Sparse Merkle registry with selective proofs (documented, I2I+I2U) — entries as leaves, proofs for individual lookups, cheap updates, anchored roots.
  • Encrypted registry state with scoped viewing keys (documented, I2I+I2U) — state stored encrypted; role-scoped viewing keys for operators, regulators and entry owners.
  • Cross-border attestation bridge (documented, I2I) — foreign queries answered with signed attestations rather than bulk data exchange.

Each sub-approach carries CROPS scores with written justification; the card follows the v2 template (issue #151) with the 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions. The open questions carry forward the use case's own, including the eWpG interaction and operator trust questions.

Accompanying changes

  • use-cases/private-registry.md: the "Approach TBD" recommended-approaches section now links the card.
  • CHANGELOG.md: [Unreleased] entry in the style of the recent approach PRs.

Checks

All six required v2 sections present, title prefix and frontmatter complete, body word count within the documented approach limit. The Vale prose gate runs in CI.

Part of #138.

Fills the Approach TBD gap on private-registry (issue ethsystems#138). Adds the
approach card comparing a sparse Merkle registry with selective proofs,
encrypted registry state with scoped viewing keys and a cross-border
attestation bridge; links the use-case card and adds the changelog entry.

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thank you for your contribution; comments inline!

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated
uses_patterns: [pattern-crypto-registry-bridge-ewpg-eas, pattern-verifiable-attestation]
```

**Summary:** Foreign registry queries are answered with signed attestations rather than raw data exchange, so sovereignty holds and query patterns stay with the parties.

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the attesting operator answers "is entity x registered" at line 117, so it learns x. each answer is also anchored on-chain. an eas attestation stores attester, recipient, schema and time in public. so anyone sees the timing and volume of queries. the use case lists query patterns as must-hide at line 42. pattern-private-information-retrieval covers this exact case ("regulatory directories"), and the card does not use it.

suggestion: use off-chain attestations or anchor batched roots, add pir for the lookup, and state what stays visible.

Suggested change
**Summary:** Foreign registry queries are answered with signed attestations rather than raw data exchange, so sovereignty holds and query patterns stay with the parties.
**Summary:** Foreign registry queries are answered with signed attestations rather than raw data exchange, so registry data stays in its jurisdiction. The answering operator learns which entity is checked unless the lookup uses private information retrieval.

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated
- Verifiers trust the anchoring chain's settlement guarantees

**Threat model:**
- An operator publishes proofs for entries it altered after anchoring (mitigated by frequent anchoring)

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a proof for an entry that changed after anchoring fails against the anchored root at any cadence. this follows from merkle binding. i did not find a source for it. the open threat is different. the operator anchors a root that already contains an unauthorized change. or it shows different roots to different verifiers. anchoring cadence mitigates neither. this also leaves "proof that all updates were authorized" from the use case at line 60 without a mechanism.

suggestion:

Suggested change
- An operator publishes proofs for entries it altered after anchoring (mitigated by frequent anchoring)
- An operator anchors a root that contains an unauthorized change, or shows different roots to different verifiers (mitigated by validity proofs over state transitions and a single canonical anchor)


### Business perspective

A registry operator's product is trust in its records, and the three models differ in what that trust costs to run. The sparse Merkle design is the least invasive and keeps the operator's role ordinary: maintain the tree, anchor roots, answer proofs. Encrypted state is worth its key-management overhead only when entry contents themselves are the sensitive asset, as with securities holders or personal licenses. The attestation bridge is the model that unlocks cross-border revenue: it answers foreign queries without breaching the sovereignty rules that otherwise block them, and it composes with either domestic model underneath. Most operators will start domestic and add the bridge as cross-border demand arrives.

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the bridge "composes with either domestic model", line 176 adds it "on top", and the hybrid at line 181 stacks all three. so the three sub-approaches are layers that a registry combines. the matrix compares options that nobody picks between.

suggestion: make the sub-approaches real alternatives for the domestic registry. examples are operator-anchored roots, validity-proven state transitions and an ewpg-style decentralized register. keep the bridge as one section over any of them.

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated
- Verifiers need to enumerate or join across entries
- The operator itself is the trust concern

CROPS rationale: CR medium, because proofs answer only what a verifier asks, but the operator gates who may query and the anchoring cadence is operator-chosen. O yes: sparse Merkle constructions and anchoring are standard, open technology. P partial: individual entries stay hidden, while query patterns and aggregate structure remain observable. S medium: cryptographic soundness is strong, with operator liveness and honest maintenance the residual trust.

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all three sub-approaches score cr: medium, but each rationale says that the operator gates access (lines 71, 104 and 136). under the rubric, medium needs an independent path without institutional approval. in an i2u context it also needs a concrete escape path, and the context: both rows name none. the bridge pattern is cr: none and pattern-verifiable-attestation is cr: low.

suggestion: cr: low for the merkle and encrypted-state rows and cr: none for the bridge, each with a one-line reason. or name the escape path.

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated
- Key ceremony and recovery overhead outweigh the registry's sensitivity
- Jurisdictions mandate plaintext mirroring of the registry of record

CROPS rationale: CR medium, because access is permissioned by key issuance and the operator controls admission, though anyone holding a key verifies without further permission. O partial: the cryptography is open, while per-registry key schemes are deployment-specific. P full at the data layer: nothing but ciphertext and commitments is public. S medium: key management concentration is the dominant risk.

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line 84 says that the operator can read what it operates. under the rubric, an operator that sees all operations scores p: none. regulator keys make it at best partial.

pattern-user-controlled-viewing-keys at line 79 is context: i2u and says that the institution never receives the viewing key. this sub-approach has the operator issue the keys. the standing register mode of pattern-regulatory-disclosure-keys-proofs fits a register of record.

suggestion: p: partial at line 78 and in the matrix, and replace pattern-user-controlled-viewing-keys in lines 9 and 79.

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated
**Avoid when:**
- The query needs rich data, not a yes/no or attribute answer

CROPS rationale: CR medium, because verification is permissioned to parties holding the operator's trust anchor, and admission is bilateral. O yes: the bridge pattern and attestation layers are open. P partial: answers are scoped to the question, while query existence and volume are visible to the counterpart. S medium: attestation honesty and schema governance are the trust carriers.

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pattern-crypto-registry-bridge-ewpg-eas is o: partial because "middleware is often proprietary". that pattern also covers one german registrar that mirrors record hashes. it has no cross-border query flow and it is maturity: concept. so documented at line 109 has no support.

suggestion: o: partial and maturity: concept, or cite the cross-border design that this sub-approach rests on.

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated
| **Performance** | cheap per-lookup proofs, cheap updates | encryption on the write and read paths | one attestation per query |
| **Operator req.** | Yes (tree maintenance) | Yes (key issuance) | Yes (attestation endpoint) |
| **Cost class** | low | medium | low |
| **Regulatory fit** | strong: proofs plus scoped disclosure | strong where scoped keys are accepted | strong: preserves sovereignty |

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for ewpg crypto securities, § 16(1) requires a "fälschungssicheres aufzeichnungssystem". § 4(11) defines that as a decentralized system. in it, control rights are split between the operating entities. one operator that keeps a tree and anchors its root does not obviously qualify. open question 2 leaves ewpg open, so "strong" in all three cells has no support. jurisdictions/de-eWpG.md exists, and the card does not link it.

suggestion: change the first cell to "depends on jurisdiction". add a constraint that names ewpg §§ 4(11) and 16(1). give each remaining "strong" a reason or a source.

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated

**Summary:** Registry entries live as leaves in a sparse Merkle tree anchored on-chain; verifiers receive Merkle proofs for specific lookups without seeing the rest of the tree.

**How it works:** The operator maintains the sparse Merkle tree, whose root is anchored on-chain each epoch. A verifier asking "is this entity registered and in good standing" receives a Merkle proof for that leaf, which proves the entry's inclusion and current status without revealing sibling entries. Updates touch only affected paths, so additions, modifications and revocations stay cheap even in very large registries. Revocations update the leaf's status field, and non-existence proofs let a verifier establish that no entry exists for a key.

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a merkle path carries a sibling hash at every level, and empty subtrees hash to known default values. so a proof shows which subtrees near the key are occupied. a low-entropy leaf can be brute-forced from its hash unless the leaf is a salted commitment. this follows from the construction. i did not test a proof.

suggestion: require salted leaf commitments and note the occupancy leak. to hide the path, wrap the proof in zk as in pattern-private-mtp-auth.

Comment thread approaches/approach-private-registry.md Outdated
2. How do privacy-preserving registries interact with existing registry legal frameworks such as eWpG crypto-registry requirements?
3. What is the minimum viable cross-border attestation protocol that satisfies both privacy and sovereignty requirements?
4. How should registry corrections (errors, court orders) work in an append-only privacy-preserving system?
5. What trust assumptions must registered entities make about operator liveness, censorship resistance and honest state transitions, and how can they be minimized or made verifiable?

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the use case lists data availability among the operator trust assumptions at line 82. this line drops it. for the merkle sub-approach it is the main liveness risk: holders need their paths if the operator withholds data.

suggestion:

Suggested change
5. What trust assumptions must registered entities make about operator liveness, censorship resistance and honest state transitions, and how can they be minimized or made verifiable?
5. What trust assumptions must registered entities make about operator liveness, censorship resistance, Data Availability and honest state transitions, and how can they be minimized or made verifiable?

Comment thread CHANGELOG.md Outdated

## [Unreleased]

- feat(approach): [Private Registry](approaches/approach-private-registry.md), filling the "Approach TBD" gap on [Private Registry](use-cases/private-registry.md), whose recommended-approaches section now links to the card. Compares a sparse Merkle registry with selective proofs (documented, I2I+I2U), encrypted registry state with scoped viewing keys (documented) and a cross-border attestation bridge (documented, I2I), with a 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions.

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the entry has no pr link. .claude/CLAUDE.md asks for one.

suggestion:

Suggested change
- feat(approach): [Private Registry](approaches/approach-private-registry.md), filling the "Approach TBD" gap on [Private Registry](use-cases/private-registry.md), whose recommended-approaches section now links to the card. Compares a sparse Merkle registry with selective proofs (documented, I2I+I2U), encrypted registry state with scoped viewing keys (documented) and a cross-border attestation bridge (documented, I2I), with a 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions.
- feat(approach): [Private Registry](approaches/approach-private-registry.md), filling the "Approach TBD" gap on [Private Registry](use-cases/private-registry.md), whose recommended-approaches section now links to the card. Compares a sparse Merkle registry with selective proofs (documented, I2I+I2U), encrypted registry state with scoped viewing keys (documented) and a cross-border attestation bridge (documented, I2I), with a 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions. ([#219](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/219))

- merkle sub-approach: salted leaf commitments required, occupancy leak stated, zk wrap via pattern-private-mtp-auth; unauthorized-root / split-view threat replaces the stale-proof framing
- bridge: off-chain attestations or batched roots for timing/volume, PIR for the lookup; maturity concept, O partial, CR none per the pattern; suggested summary applied
- sub-approaches framed as the two domestic alternatives with the bridge as an overlay layer
- CR low for merkle and encrypted-state rows with the institutional-approval reason; P partial for encrypted state (the operator reads what it operates); matrix updated
- pattern-user-controlled-viewing-keys dropped (the operator issues keys); disclosure-keys pattern carries scoped access
- key revocation truth: revoking stops future grants, cannot recall data already in scope
- eWpG section 16(1) and 4(11) constraint added, de-eWpG linked, regulatory fit first cell depends on jurisdiction
- open question 5 gains Data Availability; changelog entry gains its PR link
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