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feat(approach): Private Supply Chain and Procurement - #216

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Darkjay123:approach-private-supply-chain
Nov 18, 2026
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rymnc merged 2 commits into
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Darkjay123:approach-private-supply-chain

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Fills the "Approach TBD" gap on two use-case cards from issue #138: Private Supply Chain and Private Procurement, which share one approach.

What this adds

New approach card Private Supply Chain and Procurement (approaches/approach-private-supply-chain.md) comparing three sub-approaches:

  • Attested handoff chain (documented, I2I+I2U) — per-party attestations with minimal public payloads, encrypted off-chain detail, scoped disclosure to regulators.
  • Committed logistics data with compliance proofs (concept, I2I+I2U) — commit-and-prove against batch/invoice data; the verifier learns the claim, not the data.
  • Sealed procurement on shared rails (concept, I2I) — commit-and-reveal bids, contract-enforced phase timing, attested evaluation, milestone payments.

Each sub-approach carries CROPS scores with written justification. The card follows the v2 template (issue #151): scenario, requirements/constraints, per-sub-approach structure, the required 10-row comparison matrix, business/technical/legal perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions.

Accompanying changes

  • use-cases/private-supply-chain.md and use-cases/private-procurement.md: the "Approach TBD" recommended-approaches sections now link the card; the two use cases are cross-linked as related.
  • CHANGELOG.md: [Unreleased] entry in the style of the recent approach PRs (e.g. feat: add approach card for private institutional messaging #215).

Checks

Ran the repo's own validation locally where possible: all six required v2 sections present, title prefix and frontmatter fields complete, body word count within the documented approach limit. The Vale prose gate runs in CI.

Part of #138.

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thank you for your contribution! left some comments inline

use_case: private-supply-chain
related_use_cases: [private-procurement]

primary_patterns: [pattern-verifiable-attestation, pattern-commit-and-prove, pattern-l2-encrypted-offchain-audit]

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pattern-commit-and-prove is "commit-and-prove cross-chain settlement". it links two settlement legs with a shared commitment and scores p: none. lines 84 and 120 use it for zk compliance proofs and for sealed bids, which it does not cover. the use cases on master already have this link, and the pr carries it into uses_patterns.

suggestion: drop it. sub-approach 2 keeps pattern-zk-proof-systems. for sealed bids, use pattern-verifiable-dkg-threshold-decryption, whose example is a sealed-bid auction.

uses_patterns: [pattern-commit-and-prove, pattern-l2-encrypted-offchain-audit]
```

**Summary:** The procurement leg: bids committed sealed on-chain, opened by the contract at the deadline, evaluation evidenced against declared criteria, and payment released on attested milestones.

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a contract cannot open a hash commitment. either each bidder reveals, or a key holder decrypts. lines 129-130 already say that an evaluating entity or a key holder does the opening. with bidder reveal, a bidder can see the other bids and then withhold its reveal at no cost. the threat model does not list this. this follows from how commit-reveal works. i did not check a specific contract.

suggestion: say who opens the bids, and add non-reveal with a deposit or slashing to the threat model. or use threshold decryption, which removes the reveal step.

Suggested change
**Summary:** The procurement leg: bids committed sealed on-chain, opened by the contract at the deadline, evaluation evidenced against declared criteria, and payment released on attested milestones.
**Summary:** The procurement leg: bids committed sealed on-chain, opened after the deadline by bidder reveal or by a threshold key holder, evaluation evidenced against declared criteria, and payment released on attested milestones.

| **Trust model** | signed attestations per party, consortium schema | cryptographic proofs, no data disclosure | contract-enforced commit/reveal timing |
| **Privacy scope** | payloads minimized, existence public | claim-only disclosure, private by design | amounts hidden, timing observable |
| **Performance** | not measured | proof generation per check, not measured | two-phase ceremony per tender |
| **Operator req.** | Yes (off-chain store, disclosure keys) | Yes (proving infrastructure, data custody) | No (contract-run phases) |

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this cell says "no". but line 129 needs an evaluating entity to open bids. line 159 also lists "dishonest opening" as a failure mode.

suggestion:

Suggested change
| **Operator req.** | Yes (off-chain store, disclosure keys) | Yes (proving infrastructure, data custody) | No (contract-run phases) |
| **Operator req.** | Yes (off-chain store, disclosure keys) | Yes (proving infrastructure, data custody) | Yes (opening or key holder) |

| **Performance** | not measured | proof generation per check, not measured | two-phase ceremony per tender |
| **Operator req.** | Yes (off-chain store, disclosure keys) | Yes (proving infrastructure, data custody) | No (contract-run phases) |
| **Cost class** | low | high | medium |
| **Regulatory fit** | strong: selective disclosure to regulators | strong where claims suffice; weak where raw record mandated | strong: matches sealed-bid statutes |

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line 125 allows bids to open on-chain. for eu public procurement, directive 2014/24/eu annex iv(f) says that opened data "must remain accessible only to persons authorised to acquaint themselves therewith". article 21(1) bars disclosure of "the confidential aspects of tenders". a public on-chain opening breaks both. "as most regimes do" at line 139 and "generally permit" at line 173 have no source.

suggestion: remove the public on-chain opening from line 125, and hedge lines 139 and 173.

Suggested change
| **Regulatory fit** | strong: selective disclosure to regulators | strong where claims suffice; weak where raw record mandated | strong: matches sealed-bid statutes |
| **Regulatory fit** | strong: selective disclosure to regulators | strong where claims suffice; weak where raw record mandated | depends on the opening model; public opening conflicts with EU tender confidentiality |


- Prove origin, handling and compliance at each handoff without exposing supplier identities
- Verify authenticity at the point of use: pharmacy dispensing, customs checkpoints
- Keep bid amounts and bidder identities sealed until evaluation closes

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no sub-approach seals bidder identities. each commit comes from the bidder's own address, and the rationale at line 144 says that commitments hide only amounts. the procurement use case requires this at line 26.

suggestion: add a relayer or shielded submission to the sealed procurement leg, for example with pattern-private-transaction-broadcasting. or state the identity leak as a limit.

- Regulators require the raw record itself by statute, not just claims
- Parties cannot operate proving infrastructure at unit scale (millions of units per year)

CROPS rationale: CR high, because verification is permissionless once claims are defined and exclusion requires blocking the chain rather than an operator's decision. O partial: the proof-system stacks are open, but circuits and claim semantics are authored per deployment. P full: nothing beyond the claim is revealed by design. S medium: cryptographic assumptions are strong; circuit correctness and off-chain data custody are the weak links.

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on-chain commitments show who committed, when and how often. that is the reason that line 76 gives sub-approach 1 only p: partial. regulator disclosure at line 27 also makes this partial under the rubric. for cr, proposer censorship of commits gives cr: medium at line 144, but the same on-chain commits get cr: high here.

suggestion: p: partial and cr: medium at line 83 and in the matrix, or explain the difference.

- The proof system and circuits are public and auditable
- Claim semantics (what "compliant" means) are encoded in circuits all parties can review
- Off-chain source data must survive; its loss breaks future proofs
- Proving infrastructure availability is an operational dependency

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a zk proof shows that the committed data satisfies the claim. it does not show that the data is true. a party can commit to a false temperature log and prove that it is in range. for anti-counterfeiting, this is the main risk, and neither threat model lists it. this follows from what a proof statement covers.

suggestion: add a trust assumption for the source of the committed data.

Suggested change
- Proving infrastructure availability is an operational dependency
- Proving infrastructure availability is an operational dependency
- Committed inputs come from signed sensors, issuer attestations or zkTLS; a proof cannot make false input data true


**Summary:** The procurement leg: bids committed sealed on-chain, opened by the contract at the deadline, evaluation evidenced against declared criteria, and payment released on attested milestones.

**How it works:** Bidders commit to their bids on-chain before a deadline; the contract enforces commit and reveal phase timing so late bids and post-commit modification are impossible. After the deadline, bids open, on-chain or to the evaluation committee under disclosure keys depending on the jurisdiction. Evaluation outcomes are attested against the declared criteria, so the trail shows procedure was followed without revealing losing-bid detail. Payment runs on attested milestones with amounts visible only to the parties and their auditors.

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the evaluator attests to its own evaluation, so the trail shows an assertion. the procurement use case asks for "proof that evaluation followed declared criteria" at line 60.

suggestion: say "asserted" here, or prove the evaluation in zk against the committed criteria.


### Default

For the baseline institutional case, moderate volume and standard compliance, the attested handoff chain is the default: it delivers verifiable provenance and sealed audit trails on infrastructure that runs today, and leaves room to deepen privacy where a specific segment demands it.

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only the attestation layer runs in production: pattern-verifiable-attestation is production. the audit trail comes from pattern-l2-encrypted-offchain-audit and pattern-regulatory-disclosure-keys-proofs, which are both testnet. line 165 makes the same claim.

suggestion:

Suggested change
For the baseline institutional case, moderate volume and standard compliance, the attested handoff chain is the default: it delivers verifiable provenance and sealed audit trails on infrastructure that runs today, and leaves room to deepen privacy where a specific segment demands it.
For the baseline institutional case, moderate volume and standard compliance, the attested handoff chain is the default: its attestation layer runs in production today, its encrypted audit trail is at testnet maturity, and it leaves room to deepen privacy where a specific segment demands it.

Comment thread CHANGELOG.md Outdated

## [Unreleased]

- feat(approach): [Private Supply Chain and Procurement](approaches/approach-private-supply-chain.md), filling the "Approach TBD" gap on [Private Supply Chain](use-cases/private-supply-chain.md) and [Private Procurement](use-cases/private-procurement.md), whose recommended-approaches sections now link to the card. Compares an attested handoff chain (documented, I2I+I2U), committed logistics data with compliance proofs (concept) and sealed procurement on shared rails (concept, I2I), with a 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions.

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the entry has no pr link. .claude/CLAUDE.md asks for one.

suggestion:

Suggested change
- feat(approach): [Private Supply Chain and Procurement](approaches/approach-private-supply-chain.md), filling the "Approach TBD" gap on [Private Supply Chain](use-cases/private-supply-chain.md) and [Private Procurement](use-cases/private-procurement.md), whose recommended-approaches sections now link to the card. Compares an attested handoff chain (documented, I2I+I2U), committed logistics data with compliance proofs (concept) and sealed procurement on shared rails (concept, I2I), with a 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions.
- feat(approach): [Private Supply Chain and Procurement](approaches/approach-private-supply-chain.md), filling the "Approach TBD" gap on [Private Supply Chain](use-cases/private-supply-chain.md) and [Private Procurement](use-cases/private-procurement.md), whose recommended-approaches sections now link to the card. Compares an attested handoff chain (documented, I2I+I2U), committed logistics data with compliance proofs (concept) and sealed procurement on shared rails (concept, I2I), with a 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions. ([#216](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/216))

Fills the Approach TBD gap on private-supply-chain and private-procurement
(part of issue ethsystems#138). Adds the approach card comparing an attested handoff
chain, committed logistics data with compliance proofs and sealed
procurement on shared rails, links both use-case cards to it, and adds the
changelog entry.
…in and Procurement

- drop pattern-commit-and-prove (cross-chain settlement, not zk compliance or sealed bids); keep pattern-zk-proof-systems for proofs, use pattern-verifiable-dkg-threshold-decryption for sealed bids
- state who opens bids (bidder reveal or threshold key holder); add the non-reveal/withholding risk (deposit/slashing or threshold decryption)
- remove public on-chain bid opening; cite EU directive 2014/24/EU, hedge the regime claims
- add relayer/shielded submission for bidder identities (pattern-private-transaction-broadcasting)
- rubric-consistent scores: CR low/O partial for attested handoff, CR medium/P partial for committed data; matrix updated
- add committed-inputs trust assumption (signed sensors, attestations or zkTLS)
- name inclusion lists (pattern-focil-eip7805) and the EU 2016/161 300 ms dispensing latency
- evaluation outcomes asserted by the evaluator; recommendation matches attestation-production/audit-testnet maturity
- changelog entry gains its PR link
@Darkjay123
Darkjay123 force-pushed the approach-private-supply-chain branch from b107411 to 162f5b3 Compare November 17, 2026 14:22
@rymnc
rymnc merged commit 9502bfa into ethsystems:master Nov 18, 2026
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