Canary's security model — what is enforced in code, what is a structural convention, what is only a contract without an installed provider, and the local ceilings it explicitly does not claim — lives in:

• docs/SECURITY.md — the full contract, tiered.
• docs/TRUST-ARCHITECTURE.md — where authority lives today, and the list of providers that do not exist yet.
• docs/CAPABILITY-LEVELS.md — what LOCAL, ADVISORY, UNSUPPORTED and the unreachable HARDENED mean, and how the level is measured.

This file exists so GitHub's security tooling and anyone scanning the repository root can find the policy.

Read the ceilings before reporting. They are deliberate and detailed: there is no filesystem jail and no network egress allowlist for the code Canary runs, the evidence manifest is tamper-evidence rather than authenticated provenance, the trust store is protected against forging but not against a same-UID process replacing it wholesale, and HARDENED is not available because no provider with a separate OS identity is installed. A report that something already documented as out of contract is not a vulnerability — but a report showing that a documented bound is weaker in practice than claimed is exactly what we want.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security → Report a vulnerability). If that channel is unavailable, open a normal issue asking for a private contact channel and containing no exploit details.

Please include, where applicable:

• the exact commit or tag;
• the command you ran and its full output (Canary's own discipline: a claim without a reproduced command is not yet a report);
• which tier of docs/SECURITY.md the finding breaks — Tier A (enforced in code), Tier B (structural convention), or Tier C (absent and not claimed);
• whether it needs same-UID access, a hostile repository, or a hostile spec.

v1.1 is an implementation candidate, not a release. Fixes land on the current development branch; older tags are not maintained.