Repository navigation
docs: define the application diff reviewer pilot - #1177
Merged
pengfei-threemoonslab merged 46 commits intoNov 18, 2026
Merged
Conversation
pengfei-threemoonslab
marked this pull request as ready for review
November 17, 2026 21:38
…a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146)
* fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes
* fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references
* fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change
) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing
* fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence
* test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files
* fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins
…d Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest
* fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection
* fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site
Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate.
Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs.
* fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry
* fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes
* fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries
…imit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin.
* feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors
* fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors
…#1200) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * fix(host-diff): bind command-setting script bytes
* fix(cli): emit structured recovery for handled command errors * test(cli): assert worker refusal through exit code and stderr * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented comma…
* fix(cli): emit structured recovery for handled command errors * test(cli): assert worker refusal through exit code and stderr * fix(cli): fail closed on unread inputs and missing fixture evidence
…#1194) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(inputs): retain JSONC and JSONL data and type malformed input errors (#1043) * fix(inputs): bound YAML expansion and structured nesting (#1043) * Run PR checks against main after retargeting * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_r…
* fix(identity): stabilize expiry, TOML evidence and local repository IDs (#1034) * fix(control): preserve distinct remote-less workspace identities * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holdi…
…ncating (#1079) (#1187) * fix(privacy): redact the capability lock family and redact before truncating (#1079) capabilities.lock.json, both capability-lock-diff files and both capability delta attestations were built from unredacted capability facts, so a key in a tool name, owner (controls.evidence_owner), scope, authority source or source pointer was published verbatim, including in changed[] rows and semantic_changes[]. Redact where the lock is assembled, before any digest is taken, and where a lock is read back. Each capability digest whose input redaction changed is recomputed over the redacted text by one shared recipe, and the id follows identity_hash, so every published digest (ids, set hashes, payload subject keys and set digests) describes the published text and the reference consumer accepts the attestations. A fact or lock with nothing to redact keeps every byte; an old lock reads back as the fresh export. Two capabilities that redaction would merge keep their source identity digests. Redact before cutting text to a length: the n8n HTTP path hint (200), skill excerpts (180), and the Python reader's expression text (160) and source-slot refusal rows (1,024) cut first, so a credential straddling the cut published its head. New core.privacy helpers redact_and_truncate / truncate_redacted never cut inside a redaction marker. The #1077 leak test no longer excludes the lock family. STABILITY gains a migration note and rewords the #1026 note's sentence about the lock family. * fix(privacy): redact instruction previews and Git diagnostics before bounding; correct the lock digest claims (#1079) Review cycle 1 on #1187. - The agent's instructions.value_preview (OpenAI and Anthropic prompt files, ADK instruction) was cut to 500 characters before report-time redaction, so a key across the cut published its head in report.json and packet.json. Git's diagnostic in a verify diff status was bounded to 240 characters and never redacted. Both now go through redact_and_truncate / truncate_redacted, with a straddle test for each source type. - Read-time redactions are not counted in privacy_audit. Documented in the migration note with a link to #586, and pinned by two tests that name it; the counting itself is left to #586. - STABILITY, CHANGELOG and docs/capability-standard.md no longer say every published digest describes what is shown: tool_id (tool_v2_) and the observation ids (obs_v1_) are digests of source text a reader cannot recompute and can check by dictionary, as on main. - The collision fallback's diff rows are best effort and reachable only with name-derived tool ids; the docstring, STABILITY and the test say so. * fix(privacy): drop a cut word at the Git stderr capture limit and never cut through a marker (#1079) Review cycle 2 on #1187. - The Git stderr capture keeps the first 8 KiB; a token cut at that limit could land in the 240-character diagnostic too short for any rule. When the capture fills the limit, its last word is dropped before decoding. - verify's headline title (_bounded, _bounded_bytes) and an evidence gap's headline subject bound already-redacted text but could cut through a [REDACTED:...] marker and publish half of it. Both now cut with truncate_redacted. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(p…
…ions (#1196) * fix(inputs): preserve constructor evidence for bounded Python expressions (#1037) * test(ci): align generator comparison and stabilize the wheel fixture * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they …
… a tool's row (#1146 follow-up) (#1214) * fix(application): code that can rebind the agent module's names keeps a tool's row (#1146 follow-up) * docs(changelog): amend #1146's compatibility sentence and record the rebinding follow-up's corpus result (#1146) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(application): rebinding reasons survive copy, every unread import counts, and a caller's namespace write keeps the row (#1146 follow-up) * docs(changelog): the rebinding follow-up counts every unread import and a caller's namespace write (#1146) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result mo…
* Resolve nested scan paths in SARIF Refs #1047 * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached…
…and stale-manifest checks read the catalog (#1035) (#1164) * fix(checks): keyword evidence no longer blocks or gaps three checks, and stale-manifest checks read the catalog (#1035) Applies the owner's #1055 ruling (Option A: lexical heuristics never move the verdict) to the checks #1035 names, through one in-process catalog flag, advisory_when_policy_ineligible: an instance whose only weakness is inferred_keyword/inferred_regex evidence is published as a non-blocking advisory finding and raises no evidence gap. - SHIP-ACTION-EFFECT-ESCALATED blocks only when the head effect can drive hard controls and a policy-eligible claim places it above the base; a keyword-only escalation is a medium advisory with keyword_heuristic provenance and inferred_keyword support. SHIP-ACTION-SAFEGUARD-REMOVED takes the same guard; a removed rollback is critical only for an established destructive effect. - SHIP-SCOPE-PROHIBITED-TOOL-PRESENT compares whole-word stems, needs two shared words including an action verb, ignores more connectives, and is a medium advisory instead of a non-waivable gap. - The stale-manifest checks compare with the tool catalog: an entry naming a catalog tool whose binding is not established says so (issues: [binding_not_established]) and gets a manual keep-the-entry patch, never a remove_pointer patch. Goldens regenerated with scripts/regenerate_goldens.py; sample decisions do not move. * fix(checks): prohibited-action matches keep their leading verb, and advisories never count as coverage (#1035) Review of #1164: - The prohibited-action matcher needed a verb from a closed list, so "buy stock without approval" against broker.buy_stock published nothing at all. A shared word now counts as the verb when it is the prohibited action's leading word; ACTION_VERBS is widened, and an explicit ACTION_SYNONYMS table joins delete/purge/remove, update/modify/edit/change, buy/purchase and the like. "shut down" reads as shutdown, "e-mail" as email, and a tool named for the safeguard a "without" clause names (send_email_preview) is not the prohibited action. - Lexical advisories are labelled, not counted: misalignments say "Advisory (lexical evidence, does not gate)", sort last and suggest no scenario; capability_facts ignore them; the packet's evidence matrix lists them as notes, so no coverage status moves. - The end-to-end rewording test pins review_required (the remaining SHIP-MCP-PERMISSION-EXPANDED review item, #1055), and the STABILITY note no longer claims the verdict equals the head scan's; it records the fingerprint rotation of a keyword-only critical rollback removal and that the matcher also widens, as advisories only. * fix(checks): prohibited-action matches pair a verb with its own object, and a partial safeguard word no longer hides one (#1035) Review of #1164, cycle 2: - The "without" clause skipped any tool whose name shared one word with it, before the risk-tag rules ran, so "send email without customer consent" against send_customer_email published nothing. The word comparison is now skipped only when the tool name contains every word of the clause (send_email_preview for "without preview"), and the risk-tag rules always run. - The leading word counted as the verb even when the action held a listed verb, synonyms mapped nouns to verbs, and any tool word could pair with the verb. The action's verbs are now its listed verbs (joined by or/and), else a noun naming one, else its leading word; its direct object ends at a preposition. A tool clause (its name's verb and what it acts on, or the description's leading verb and object head) must share both. Synonyms are verb to verb and apply in verb position only, so github.create_issue, close_ticket and delete_comment no longer match unrelated prohibited actions. * fix(checks): prohibited-action matching prefers recall: two shared words, one the action's verb (#1035) Review of #1164, cycle 3 (coordinator ruling: recall over precision, since every outcome is an advisory): - Drop the tool-side clause parser and its TOOL_VERBS/preposition machinery. It missed genuine matches main made: a verb that is not the description's first word (crm.cleanup "Permanently delete customer records."), list objects, noun-first multi-word names (records.bulk_delete), non-adjacent second verbs, and "deletion of". - The rule is now the tool's name and description sharing two words with the action, one of them the action's verb: every listed verb it contains, else a nominalisation, else its leading word. Synonyms and nominalisations apply to every word on both sides. The whole-clause "without" rule stays, and the risk-tag rules always run. - Homographs and shared generic nouns that still match (issue refunds vs github.create_issue, close customer accounts vs close_ticket) are documented as known advisory false positives, not tested as matches. * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) …
* test: cover the six reported verdict mutations (#1155) * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did b…
* test(adoption): collect and repair deterministic agent tasks (#1048) * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.…
…-map (#1121) (#1126) * feat(capability): record tool definitions in the capability lock (#1117) A change to an MCP tools/list entry's description, output schema or annotations, with its name and arguments unchanged, produced a lock whose facts and set hashes were identical and a lock diff reading `changed: 0, unchanged: 1`, while verifier.json `capability_review` already said `tool definition changed`. A reviewed lock compared later could not see the change a tool-poisoning or rug-pull edit makes. Capability standard 0.6 (lock 0.9, lock diff 0.10): - each fact built from a tool carries `definition`, digests of the stripped description, the output schema and the annotations; never text - the lock gains `hashes.definition_set_hash`; lock refs carry it - the lock diff gains `definition_changed[]` rows naming exactly the parts that moved, independent of the semantic buckets, with no direction - capability-lock-diff.md gains a "Tool Definitions Changed" table - a 0.8 lock still loads; pairing it with a 0.9 lock is refused with the re-export command Unchanged: release_decision.decision, findings, exit codes, CapabilityHashName, the report and verifier schemas, and the frozen shipgate.capability_payload/v1 (documented: it does not carry definitions). Agent-authored with Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5); a person must read the diff before merge. * feat(capability): publish capability_payload/v2 with tool-definition digests (#1117) The lock now records a tool's definition, but the frozen capability_payload/v1, and so the exported capability-delta attestation, could not carry it: a rewritten tool description was still not a row in the attestation. v1 is closed, so this publishes v2 beside it, as the payload's evolution policy prescribes. - shipgate.capability_payload/v2: every record's digests gain description_hash, output_schema_hash and annotations_hash (the lock's digests, under the lock diff's part names), null together when no definition is stated; changed_dimensions may name them; they are inside capability_set_digest. A definition-only change is a changed row with direction unknown and no explanations. Every other rule is v1's: the v2 models subclass v1's - capability-delta/v2 predicate and shipgate.capability_delta_attestation/v2 wrap it with v1's envelope rules - verify writes capability-delta-attestation.v2.json beside the unchanged v1 file; the authorization closure, stale-file cleanup and PR comment know the new artifact - contract --json and .well-known name the v2 versions, schema paths, predicate type and artifact in six fields beside v1's (runtime contract v42, unreleased) - tools/verify-capability-delta.py 1.1.0 verifies both versions, choosing by predicateType - v2 schemas and worked examples generated; v1 files byte-identical No verdict, release decision or exit code changes. Agent-authored with Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5); a person must read the diff before merge. * feat(attest): record who approved the change from host-supplied reviews (#1118) An attestation recorded who triggered the run (org.actor) and what the manifest declared (human_ack), but not who approved the pull request, so a ledger could not answer "who approved this change to what the agent may do". - `attest --reviews <file>` reads the JSON array GitHub's pull request reviews API returns, fetched by the workflow, and records `approval` (attestation 0.6): approved / approved_stale / changes_requested / not_approved against the attested head, approvers, standing change requests, and ignored approvals by the author or a bot - the file must be outside the repository (Git work tree around cwd or verifier.json, GITHUB_WORKSPACE, or a committed link); a review naming another pull request is refused; exit 3 either way - status is recomputed from the rows on read, so a hand-edited attestation that claims an approval its rows do not support is rejected - the lock binding records definition_set_hash and the diff summary definition_changed (capability standard 0.6) - registry rows carry approval_status/approval (registry 0.5); summary counts by_approval_status; old rows keep their ids and chain hashes - org bundle upgrades a 0.5 attestation to 0.6 as not_supplied The engine calls no API, and the approval never changes the verdict, the release decision, an exit code or the bypass rule. Agent-authored with Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5); a person must read the diff before merge. * fix(attest): bind the approval to the verified commit; validate it in the ledger (#1118) attest --reviews evaluated the reviews against the event's (or --head-sha's) head commit, which nothing tied to what the receipt-bound verify run evaluated. A run at commit A with an event and reviews naming commit B recorded `approved` for B beside A's evidence. The reviews are now evaluated against the head commit of the plan the validated receipt binds, and attest exits 3 when that commit is not the pull request's head (a synthetic merge checkout, another revision's artifacts), when --head-sha names another commit, when verify evaluated uncommitted working-tree changes, or when no receipt is beside verifier.json. The docs workflow verifies the PR head. registry ingest copied the approval block from raw JSON, and the row model held it as a dict, so a block AttestationApprovalV1 rejects (approved with no approver) was ingested, verified ok and counted as approved. The row model now validates the block as the attestation model does and requires approval_status to be its status: ingest refuses such an attestation (exit 3) and every reader skips such a ledger row, which registry verify reports. * feat(registry): record scheduled drift comparisons as ledger rows (#1119) `audit --host --drift` and `capability diff` compare the repository with its approved state, but a scheduled run's result lived only in its workflow log: a team could show its monitoring configuration, not a record that monitoring ran, what it compared against, or what it found. - `registry ingest --observation <audit --host --drift --json>` (and optionally `--capability-diff` from the same run) appends a `drift_observation` row (registry 0.6), chained with the attestation rows of its repository: the declared `--event-time` (required, UTC), commit and run (`--ci-context github-actions` or flags), baseline and lock identities, status (drift / incomparable / clean, recomputed on read), and each moved grant, artifact or capability by id, kind and direction - copies no command, argument, URL, env value, rule text or tool description; an absolute baseline path is reduced to its name - idempotent per run; two clean runs on two days are two rows - `registry report --drift [--repo --since --until --expected-interval-days --fail-on-drift]` counts runs with drift, runs that could not compare, and gaps between runs (window edges included); exit 20 on any with --fail-on-drift - observation rows are never bypass candidates; summary counts by_row_kind and by_observation_status and keeps release counts to attestations - `row_kind: attestation` and `observation: null` are left out of row hashes, so earlier ledgers keep their ids and chain - docs/post-approval-monitoring.md: what an observation establishes and does not, a two-job daily and on-push workflow with a protected `shipgate-ledger` branch and one `shipgate:drift` issue, and reading the record; the copyable examples/ file waits for the release that ships `--observation`, since recipe pins must name a published release The engine reads no clock and calls no API, and an observation changes no verdict, release decision or verify exit code. Agent-authored with Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5); a person must read the diff before merge. * feat(registry): write an audit-window evidence extract with --control-map (#1121) A team preparing an assessment turned the ledger into evidence by hand, and a hand-made summary cannot be checked against the ledger it came from. - `registry report --control-map <map> --since --until [--expected-interval-days] [--repo] [--out <dir>] [--json]` arranges one window of ledger rows by a control map: per evidence item, the cited row ids, counts, and every gap a closed set of rules finds, printed as found, none or not_checked - gap rules: no_rows_in_window, observation_interval (the drift report's rule), observation_incomparable, inventory_issues, capability_comparison_absent, definition_digests_absent, approval_not_supplied, approval_not_approved - --out writes control-evidence.json (control evidence 0.1), control-evidence.md and ledger-extract.jsonl: the cited ledger lines byte for byte, plus the last observation of a repository the window holds none of; the printed recompute command over the extract gives the same controls block (tested) - maps are data (control map 0.1); docs/control-maps/aiuc-1.yaml covers AIUC-1 B006 and E004 as the April 2026 evidence list numbers them and lists B006.2 (runtime monitoring) and E004.2 (code signing) as not evidenced by the ledger - byte-identical output for the same arguments on any machine; no word in it judges a control (tested) - docs/control-evidence.md, schemas, STABILITY, CHANGELOG Built ahead of the assessor question in the gate issue at the owner's request; opened as a draft. Exits 0 whatever it finds: evidence, not a gate. Agent-authored with Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5); a person must read the diff before merge. * test(registry): read the --expected-interval-days usage error as plain text The click range error for `--expected-interval-days 0` is rendered by rich, which colours option names when GITHUB_ACTIONS is set, so in CI the option name in the message was split by escape codes and the assertion failed (suite shard 3 on #1125). The flag test now invokes with NO_COLOR and without GITHUB_ACTIONS/FORCE_COLOR, as tests/test_actions_token_scope.py does, and strips any styling left before matching. * fix(registry): an incomparable host comparison is always a gap; the extract recomputes from --out on any OS (#1121) observation_incomparable tested the row's status, which reports capability drift before host incomparability, so a run whose capability diff drifted while its host comparison could not be made cleared the rule; with an old or unsupported baseline (no inventory issue) B006.1 then reported no comparison gap at all. The rule now reads host.comparison_status. With --out the printed command named ledger-extract.jsonl relative to the output directory but the map by the caller's path, so the documented form (a relative map, then the command run inside --out) exited 2. --out now writes the map's bytes as control-map.yaml and the command names that copy. The four files are written as exact bytes with \n line ends. A text-mode write on Windows turned each \n into \r\n, so the extract no longer hashed to the view's extract.sha256. The control-map fixtures now build approval blocks attest could write: the ledger refuses a bare {"status": "approved"} since #1118's fix. * feat(attest): record who approved the change from host-supplied reviews (#1118) An attestation recorded who triggered the run (org.actor) and what the manifest declared (human_ack), but not who approved the pull request, so a ledger could not answer "who approved this change to what the agent may do". - `attest --reviews <file>` reads the JSON array GitHub's pull request reviews API returns, fetched by the workflow, and records `approval` (attestation 0.6): approved / approved_stale / changes_requested / not_approved against the attested head, approvers, standing change requests, and ignored approvals by the author or a bot - the file must be outside the repository (Git work tree around cwd or verifier.json, GITHUB_WORKSPACE, or a committed link); a review naming another pull request is refused; exit 3 either way - status is recomputed from the rows on read, so a hand-edited attestation that claims an approval its rows do not support is rejected - the lock binding records definition_set_hash and the diff summary definition_changed (capability standard 0.6) - registry rows carry approval_status/approval (registry 0.5); summary counts by_approval_status; old rows keep their ids and chain hashes - org bundle upgrades a 0.5 attestation to 0.6 as not_supplied The engine calls no API, and the approval never changes the verdict, the release decision, an exit code or the bypass rule. Agent-authored with Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5); a person must read the diff before merge. * fix(attest): bind the approval to the verified commit; validate it in the ledger (#1118) attest --reviews evaluated the reviews against the event's (or --head-sha's) head commit, which nothing tied to what the receipt-bound verify run evaluated. A run at commit A with an event and reviews naming commit B recorded `approved` for B beside A's evidence. The reviews are now evaluated against the head commit of the plan the validated receipt binds, and attest exits 3 when that commit is not the pull request's head (a synthetic merge checkout, another revision's artifacts), when --head-sha names another commit, when verify evaluated uncommitted working-tree changes, or when no receipt is beside verifier.json. The docs workflow verifies the PR head. registry ingest copied the approval block from raw JSON, and the row model held it as a dict, so a block AttestationApprovalV1 rejects (approved with no approver) was ingested, verified ok and counted as approved. The row model now validates the block as the attestation model does and requires approval_status to be its status: ingest refuses such an attestation (exit 3) and every reader skips such a ledger row, which registry verify reports. * fix(inputs): preserve constructor evidence for bounded Python expressions (#1196) * fix(inputs): preserve constructor evidence for bounded Python expressions (#1037) * test(ci): align generator comparison and stabilize the wheel fixture * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1…
* docs(schemas): generate a current contract index * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_…
* test(docs): guard agent-facing schema version claims (#1039) * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the c…
) * feat(benchmark): retain pinned application replay evidence * fix(benchmark): refuse invalid and mismatched replay output * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its document…
* docs(benchmark): locate source changes in the zero-row cases * test(benchmark): replay the changed-lines probe across pinned cases * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.u…
…ce 2026-10-02 (#1158) (#1205) * feat(benchmark): pin the application holdout from the window open since 2026-10-02 (#1158) Walk the frozen holdout rule as written and commit its 30 members. - Listed every pull request created since 2026-10-02T00:00:00Z in the 8,126 pool repositories (34,936; GitHub GraphQL, read-only, cross-checked with issue search) and applied steps 2 and 3. - Judged 768 candidates in createdAt order, from source at their pinned merge base and head, up to the 30th member on 2026-10-05. Every candidate is listed in holdout.json with its pins and reason, member or skipped. - One judge, a Claude Code (Opus 5.5) agent, before any engine output; no Agents Shipgate command ran on any candidate. The record says so (`judge`) and says how the rule was read where it needed reading (`walk`). - The rule, the definitions and the pool are unchanged; their digests hold. The pinned-holdout test now also checks the stop at the 30th member and the judge statement. * fix(benchmark): scope the holdout judge statement and record move and condition readings (#1158) The judge statement said no engine output was produced for any candidate. That is true of the judge, not of the candidates: this repository's own CI ran `verify` on its 14 ThreeMoonsLab/agents-shipgate candidates. The statement in holdout.json (`judge`, `walk.method`), the README and the CHANGELOG now says what the judge did, names the CI run, and says it was not consulted; the test pins the scoped phrase. walk.interpretations gains the reading used for moves (an agent moved or renamed with unchanged bindings is the same agent, roee-hersh/toolpass#64), and the conditional-member reading now says it covers only bindings named in source and what the other reading would change (apowerb/apowerb#278 would be member 29, team-ieum/ieum-agent#65 the 30th, usestrix/strix#1446 would drop out). The test now checks the pins, merge_base != head and the state of every walked candidate, not only the members, and that the walk's counts add up: created - development - closed - no non-test .py = candidates = walked. * Resolve nested scan paths in SARIF (#1212) * Resolve nested scan paths in SARIF Refs #1047 * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings …
…anges use, and propose the next-reader decision (#916) (#1215) * docs(benchmark): measure which frameworks agent-changing PRs use, and propose the next-reader decision (#916) benchmark/framework-mix/ pins 375 public pull requests from the 90 days to 2026-11-17, each judged from source at its merge base and head: 250 from framework-neutral title searches in randomly drawn hours (the share), and 125 from per-framework code searches (how readable each framework's bindings are). Holdout-pool repositories and development-corpus pull requests are excluded before anything is read. Of the 61 neutral pull requests that change an agent's tools, sub-agents or handoffs, or an MCP server's tools: 31 use no framework, 18 change an MCP server, 5 LangChain or LangGraph, 1 PydanticAI, 6 another named framework, and none the OpenAI Agents SDK or Google ADK. docs/engineering/next-application-reader.md (status: proposed) recommends no new framework reader yet, states the criterion in Q0/Q1 terms, addresses the ROADMAP non-goal, and leaves MCP server registrations to the owner as a scope question. No reader is implemented. * test(shard): give the framework-mix benchmark test its measured weight (#916) * docs(benchmark): state the framework mix's title-frame recall and correct its judgments The neutral frame samples pull requests titled as agent tool changes. Its word rule matches 1 of the 49 development-corpus titles and 1 of the 59 relevant pull requests the framework frames found, so its shares are shares among such titles, not among agent-changing pull requests. The README, the decision record and the CHANGELOG now say so, with the recall table counted by summarize.py. - Judgments corrected after review: two capped dossiers re-read as relevant, coding-agent plugins and memory layers reclassified, one stacking rule, readability and existing-agent fixes, a local `agents` package no longer read as the SDK. Every capped not-relevant application pull request was re-read from its full patch; sample.json records dossier_capped and reread_full_patch. - reach is counted over agent-binding pull requests; criterion 1 uses addressable with reach at the low end of its interval. No reader now rests on Q1 0 of 49 and on the sample's size and frame. - Pool effect and cluster caveat stated; two titles naming a private person recorded as null. - The test checks the walked hours and candidates are the first of their seeded orders. Refs #916 * fix(application): code that can rebind the agent module's names keeps a tool's row (#1146 follow-up) (#1214) * fix(application): code that can rebind the agent module's names keeps a tool's row (#1146 follow-up) * docs(changelog): amend #1146's compatibility sentence and record the rebinding follow-up's corpus result (#1146) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(application): rebinding reasons survive copy, every unread import counts, and a caller's namespace write keeps the row (#1146 follow-up) * docs(changelog): the rebinding follow-up counts every unread import and a caller's namespace write (#1146) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_requi…
* docs: lead application review with local comparison (#1170) * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * Compare host inputs from explicit committed heads (#1204) * feat(diff): compare pinned host commits without a checkout * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(security): refuse a linked reports directory inside the repository; contain captured inputs (#1031) Review cycle 3 on #1198. - An output directory typed with --out (scan, verify, the Action's --out agents-shipgate-reports) and verify's default reports directory are walked from the repository root before they are resolved (refuse_links_inside): a link or junction in any component inside the repository is refused before inputs load or anything is written. Directories above the repository stay the operator's choice. The --out write root is the validated directory as typed. - verification-inputs/ copies go through write_contained. - The shared symlink walk and directory creation also refuse junctions. - apply-patches loads each planned target as a manifest before writing and refuses a patch that would leave it unloadable. - Tests pin the printed apply-patches command running from another directory, and the mechanical repair's --workspace. - Docs say ownership of .git is checked on POSIX only. - test_agent_control_reports_dir: the in-repository link spelling is now refused by the writer, so the test asserts the refusal. * fix(scan): anchor relative output overrides to the manifest * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1184) * fix(inputs): read encoded and deep Python source safely (#1042) * fix(inputs): keep BOM tolerance out of baseline evidence * test(inputs): isolate encoding cases from OpenAPI regressions * test(ci): measure the encoding test shard weight * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cleanup did before, so a removal that fails raises its OSError and clear_verifier_route_artifacts still turns it into ArtifactLifecycleError with the same recovery. - apply-patches --workspace goes through the shared workspace guard (require_workspace) before anything is read, like every other --workspace command: an absent, non-directory or unreadable workspace is a config_error with exit 2. It joins the workspace input sweep. * fix(inputs): handle non-text codecs and chained Python calls * docs(inputs): spell out structured input format selection * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1192) * fix(inputs): report incomplete Python tool bindings (#1038) * test(ci): measure the Python reader test shard weight * fix(sdk): keep rebound constructor candidates visible * fix(inputs): verify Python tool member bindings at their use * test: expect the tool list mutation call site * docs: explain ownership of nested manifest placeholders (#1208) * fix(verify): stop when the explicit head removes the manifest (#1210) Preserve the human stop when the explicitly evaluated head removes a manifest present at the merge base. A checkout copy cannot produce verification artifacts for the removed gate. * fix(verify): align preview and trigger comparison inputs (#1188) Use the shared base resolver and report exclusion for preview and triggers. Preserve actionable missing-ref recovery and the selected no-base mode in preview handoffs. * fix(verify): show progress before building Git archives (#1206) * fix(host): align workflow classification and case-folded parsing (#1144) * fix(host): a policy pack is not a workflow, and CI.YML is parsed as YAML (#1143) `check`'s workflow predicate (`core/host_boundary.py::_is_workflow_path`) took any `.yml`/`.yaml` the registry's `shared` adapter enumerates and tested what followed its first 18 characters for a `/`, without checking the `.github/workflows/` prefix. The `shared` adapter also enumerates `policies/*.shipgate.yaml` and the named boundary policies, so every pack was evaluated as a GitHub workflow: - a pack with a top-level `permissions: write-all` got `HOST-WORKFLOW-WRITE-ALL` and `block` from `check`, and full `verify` published it as a release-blocking finding; - a malformed pack got `HOST-CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED` (`workflow_yaml_parse_failed`). Each displaced the pack's own `BOUNDARY-PROTECTED-SURFACE-UNCLASSIFIED` row. The predicate also compared the extension case-sensitively, so `check` never evaluated `.github/workflows/CI.YML`. The reader's `parse()` chose YAML and TOML by a case-sensitive suffix. So `CI.YML`, which the registry and the reader classify as a workflow, went to the JSON parser, and both inventories recorded a blocking `parse_failed`. `diff` and `verify` came back `incomparable` with no rows, and `check` answered `require_review` (`BOUNDARY-INPUT-INCOMPLETE`) to a `write-all` widening that blocks in `ci.yml`. `.codex/CONFIG.TOML` was refused the same way. The fix: - `_is_workflow_path` delegates to `is_github_workflow_path` (#1110), so `check` evaluates exactly what the comparison reads as a workflow. - `parse()` chooses its parser by the case-folded suffix. - The Codex grant dispatch folds the suffix too, so a parsed `CONFIG.TOML` publishes its grants rather than none. GitHub documents only the `.yml`/`.yaml` extensions in `.github/workflows`, and says nothing about letter case. So a case variant stays a workflow, per `glob_match_ci`'s conservative rule. Closes #1143 * test: re-measure the #1143 test files' shard weights The `Release.Yaml` route case took the same path as `CI.YML`'s, and its suffix is already pinned by the parser and agreement cases, so it is dropped. That leaves: - tests/test_workflow_directory_instructions.py: 33 cases, 106.4 s (was 23 cases, 50.6 s); - tests/test_declared_policy_pack_boundary.py: 27 cases, 54.6 s (was 22 cases, 44.3 s). Both were measured serially on a loaded machine, where the old cases of the first file ran about 1.5x their recorded time. The weights overstate the files, which is the safe direction for the shard that holds them. * fix(host): parse every workflow name matched by the registry * fix(verify): hold the verdict on changed unreadable host inputs (#1161) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): consistently report unreadable configuration shapes * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1190) * fix(verify): preserve human review for host-only comparisons (#1152) * fix(verify): preserve incomplete host comparison recovery * fix(setup): install and route host-only advisory verification * fix(setup): load the workflow through the static wheel layout * test(verify): pin the incomplete comparison recovery command * test(setup): check the host-only advisory workflow handoff * fix(verify): preserve host review across pinned comparisons * fix(host): preserve workflow setup and review summaries * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) (#1202) * fix(verify): a changed host config the reader cannot read holds insufficient_evidence, not review_required (#1154) A pull request that added Bash(*) to .claude/settings.json was blocked (strict exit 20). The same change padded past the reader's 1 MiB bound, with a leading // line, or cut short was review_required (strict exit 0, control review_publishable): the blocker disappeared and two medium review rows stood in for it. - verify records each changed file the boundary assessment could not read as a policy evidence gap (unknown_policy_evidence, source_type agent_boundary_input), so the one decision engine holds the verdict at insufficient_evidence and strict mode exits 20. The verifier control for such a run is human_review_required, as check already said. A file git reports unchanged on both sides adds no gap. The 1 MiB bound stays. - Every host-config parse goes through one nesting bound (64 levels, core/structured_depth.py): a 5,000-deep file is a typed, file-named refusal in diff, check, audit --host and verify instead of a RecursionError traceback or internal_error. - An empty detached check --diff adds the input issue boundary_diff_empty (require_review, partial coverage) and keeps its stop; the boundary result model refuses decision allow with incomplete input coverage. * fix(verify): count every unread host file, honour no-newline markers, never allow a detached diff (#1154) Review round 1 on #1161: - The diff reader dropped Git's "\ No newline at end of file", so a new host config without a final newline was rebuilt with one, mismatched the file and read as unresolved: valid new files failed strict CI. DiffHunk records the marker per side and every rebuild honours it. A *_content_unresolved row no longer counts as unread on its own. - The assessment records which input-issue files the reader did not read: a read or parse failure, a Claude Code settings or hook shape it refuses, an enabled plugin's hook file it does not open, an OpenShell document it refuses, a binary file. verify's gap counts those, so a string where a rule list belongs, a refused OpenShell policy and an unparseable base hold the verdict too. The gap names the unread side. - A JSON host config whose top level, or MCP server map, is not an object is a CONFIG-PARSE-FAILED row (parser NotAnObject); a top-level array no longer crashes check or makes verify exit 4. - A detached diff (check --diff, MCP diff_text) never reports allow and reports coverage unknown where it read everything it named (issue boundary_diff_unbound); its stop and rows are unchanged. The boundary result model refuses allow beside a stopping control. - STABILITY and CHANGELOG state the decision precedence exactly. * fix(mcp): keep the shipgate.check description within 1024 characters (#1154) The detached-diff sentence added in the previous commit took the description to 1029 characters, past the cap test_mcp_server holds every tools/list description to for model APIs that refuse a longer one. It now states only that the decision is never allow; the coverage rule is the result model's. * fix(host): count a shape refusal as unread only for a Claude settings or hook file (#1154) Review cycle 2 on #1161: - The inventory reads a nested .github/workflows/*.yml, and the shared adapter's .shipgate/agent-contract.json and .agents-shipgate state files, as configuration under the Claude Code host, and refuses a permissions value that is not a Claude settings object. Counting that refusal as unread made a nested workflow with permissions: read-all insufficient_evidence where main said review_required. Only a Claude Code settings layer or hook file now records a shape refusal; the misfiling itself is left for a follow-up. - docs/host-boundary-support.md: unreadable boundary policies are counted as unread, and an unparseable unified or Codex policy also blocks. - The agent-protocol repair-after example is regenerated from its documented command and its README sentence corrected. - STABILITY: risk_level stays explanatory under the detached rule. * fix(host): name an unchanged in-tree directory link as an unchanged limit, not a refusal (#1004) chanzuckerberg/single-cell-data-portal#7802 changes only `.mcp.json`, and `diff` refused it: four unchanged Terraform links such as `.happy/terraform/envs/dev/modules -> ../../modules` are not at a boundary location, so the reader does not read through them, a `**/` glob could match beneath them, and each was a blocking `unreadable` limit that `unchanged_limits` never named. One untouched link hid every row. By the owner ruling of 2026-11-15, such a link is named as an unchanged `unreadable` limit, and the rows beside it kept, when Git proves it unchanged without following it (`cli/verify/git.py::unread_link_unchanged`): the same mode-120000 entry and blob on both sides, a relative text naming in one hop an in-tree directory that does not hold the link, the same tree object for that directory with no link or submodule beneath it, and in a working tree every entry beneath it read by its own entry and unfiltered hash. A link where a host reads agent configuration keeps its blocking limit, so configuration cannot be moved behind a link (`boundary_registry.is_host_configuration_location`): a configuration file's name, at, under or above an anchored configuration directory, inside a `**/` configuration directory or a plugin manifest directory, or with such a path beneath it by Git's listing. The comparator checks the link's own path too. `diff`, `verify`'s host comparison, the PR comment and a `partial` comparison read one proof. `check` cannot name a limit, so it refuses with `unchanged_limits_not_representable` as for every unchanged limit. The inventory, `audit --host`, baselines and drift are unchanged, and an unchanged link adds no #1154 evidence gap. No schema, contract, limit kind or check ID moves. Two tests pinned the old refusal with `docs/proxy -> ../src/pkg`; they now name a directory holding a link, which still refuses, keeping their intent. * fix(host): unchanged-link proof skips build output, shares work, and bounds a comparison (#1004) Review cycle 1 on PR #1202. - Build output no longer defeats the working-tree proof. A directory or link named as one the repository walk never enters (`__pycache__`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, `.pytest_cache` and the rest of `_WALK_SKIPPED_DIRECTORIES`) is not walked beneath the directory a link names, so a local test run no longer turns `diff` incomparable while `verify --head` compares. Every host's reader enumerates its sources from that walk; a file another reader opens by reference (a hook script, an OpenShell policy) is compared at its own path or carries its own limit. A file Git tracks beneath such a name still counts, checked by its own entries. Any other ignored name, such as `.terraform`, still counts. - `UnreadLinkProver` examines a directory several links name once, keyed by its path and tree object: one listing, one registry match and one working-tree check. One comparison examines at most 20,000 files and 128 MiB beneath its links. Past a bound, a link keeps its limit, and the refused comparison's coverage detail says why. The registry match a directory shares rests on an invariant now pinned by a test: beneath a link that is not itself a configuration location, whether a path is configuration depends on its part below the link alone. - CHANGELOG and STABILITY say a configured `verify --head`, as the Action runs it, still refuses any committed link at its whole-commit archive (#688), with misleading `Fix the manifest in place` advice, so such a repository never reaches this comparison in CI. - Tests pin the fail-closed branches: the 10,000-file bound, the per-link and comparison byte bounds, the comparison file budget, a gitlink beneath the directory, and `core.fileMode=false` and `core.autocrlf` checkouts. - The carve-out wording says `.cursor`, `.vscode` and `.agents` are anchored at the repository root; a nested copy is named, as tests pin. * test(diff): assert diagnostics after decoding terminal colors * Name unread host changes and compare Action helper commands (#1199) * fix(host-diff): name unread changes and compare Action helpers * fix(host-drift): distinguish malformed Action helper evidence * docs: correct YAML list placeholder paths (#593) (#1173) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) (#1162) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1174) * fix(application): a binding that reads the same on both sides is not a candidate change (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens from main's answers with #1146, and record its shard weight * docs(application): say read_same is new since 1.3.0 (#1146) * fix(application): a doubt about which definition or setting is bound keeps the row; application comparison 0.5 (#1146) * test(application): re-render the Q2 goldens with application comparison 0.5, and state what dropped rows no longer carry (#1146) * fix(application): an unread rebinding import, a guessed handoff target and an unnamed MCP endpoint keep the row (#1146) * fix(diff): show specific changes in large candidate findings (#1168) * test(application): re-render the Q2 golden inputs from the final engine's run (#1146) * fix(diff): rank candidate reach before other changes * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1175) * fix(openapi): surface unread schema carrier references (#1166) * fix(openapi): resolve media carriers and identify unread references * Count unsupported cold-start settings as changed cases Refs #1084 * fix(readers): stabilize n8n selection and explain unread MCP files (#1176) * fix(readers): make n8n selection deterministic and explain unread MCP files (#1073) * test: classify the unread MCP warning decoder as a non-message * fix(n8n): prefer canonical node fields and clarify MCP audit guidance * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1178) * fix(verify): record effective plugin opt-in in capability locks (#1062) * docs: explain where capability lock hashes change * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1179) * fix(verify): clear stale scan artifacts before manifest-free previews (#1067) * fix(verify): clear stale remediation before host comparison * fix(org): validate supplied attestation verdicts and capabilities (#1180) * fix(org): check attestation verdict and capabilities against the verifier (#1066) * docs(org): place the attestation bundle release note * fix(org): cross-check attestation claims before publishing * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1181) * fix(attest): use report evidence bound by a verified receipt (#1068) * docs(attest): place the receipt-bound evidence release note * fix(attest): publish only receipt-bound report evidence * test(packaging): check built-in entry-point declarations (#1182) * test(packaging): verify built-in check entry-point parity (#1051) * docs(packaging): explain built-in registration and wheel contract files * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1183) * fix(verify): bind prepared comparison reports to the base ref (#1076) * test(verify): check the currency of base comparison reports * fix(verify): recheck prepared comparison report origins * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) (#1198) * fix(security): anchor write containment on trusted roots; one hardened Git environment (#1031) apply-patches took its containment root from report.manifest_dir, which arrives in the same untrusted report as the patches. Targets must now also resolve under the working directory or its git toplevel; anything outside exits 5 with nothing written. A JSON pointer that does not fit its target document (a list pointer ending in "-" included) is a malformed patch: exit 2 with the malformed_patch envelope, no traceback, and every file is planned before any is written. output.directory in shipgate.yaml must be a relative path inside the manifest's directory: the manifest schema rejects absolute, drive, UNC and ".." values (docs/manifest-v0.1.json carries the rule as a pattern), and scan refuses a directory that resolves outside through a link. scan --out still writes anywhere. Every Git child in src/ takes its environment from core/git_env.py's hardened_git_env(), the union of the five hand-written copies; the hook runner has it rendered in and the zero-install detector keeps a copy, both held equal by tests/test_git_env.py. The fixture also disables hooks and signing. display_path and the symlink-chain walk each have one implementation in core/paths.py; the differences callers relied on are named arguments. * fix(security): contain every scan write and clear; apply-patches edits only the manifest (#1031) Review round on #1198, including the owner's extension of #1031's acceptance criteria to linked output leaves and linked parent directories. - core/contained_write.py: one writer for every file scan writes or clears (reports, packet files, scaffolds, current-control.json, verifier artifact cleanup). It refuses a link in any directory below the trusted root, a link, special file or hard link at the destination, and a spelling outside the root, before anything is written or removed; files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW where available. The scan checks every reports-directory artifact name before its first write. - apply-patches: a target must load as a Shipgate manifest and is refused when it is a protected agent-boundary or trust-root file. New --workspace option names the trusted root; verify's printed commands carry it. The git toplevel counts only when its .git is a directory or gitdir file owned by the user (owned_git_root_for). A directory target is a structured error. Refusals print the resolved target. - output.directory errors say to remove the value or make it relative. - Fold the remaining display-path copies (codex_config, mcp_manifest, discovery artifacts and signals) and the agent_boundary symlink walk. - Tighten the spawn-site test; state where pointers differ from RFC 6901. * fix(security): keep the cleanup-failure contract; guard apply-patches --workspace (#1031) - remove_contained removes through Path.unlink, as the cle…
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Refs #1171.
Defines a four-reviewer application-diff pilot with counterbalanced tasks, a source-evidence rubric, and next-eligible-PR reuse tracking. The ledger records the route as unrun and preserves the existing pilot records. The proposed study budget and thresholds need owner review. The released-build gate ruling and participant consent remain prerequisites for external execution.
Validation includes Ruff, 375 documentation and contract tests (one skip), and an Agents Shipgate pass. Codex authored this draft. Human review is pending.