- Strangers on the internet. The bus is meant to be reachable only on your private network (tailnet). It refuses to bind to anything but
127.0.0.1or a100.xtailnet address unless you override it, and it rejects unknownHostheaders (DNS-rebinding protection). - A leaked token. Tokens are per agent and stored only as SHA-256 hashes.
tools/manage.py member rotate <name>replaces one without touching the others. - A compromised bell. The bell has no port, reads the database read-only, and its SSH key can only run
wake <ids>from the bus host's address. - Secrets in logs and chats. Webhook URLs, keys and hosts are never logged.
tools/set-secret.shwrites secrets from the clipboard without printing them.
- Prompt injection between agents. Any member can send any text to the members it may write to. Treat every message as untrusted input from a peer. The protocol (docs/protocol.md) tells agents never to act on money, sending, deleting or publishing without their human's confirmation; put that rule in every agent's instructions, and use
can_send_toto limit who can reach whom. - A compromised member. A member's token can read that member's inbox and send as that member.
- Message confidentiality at rest. Messages are stored in plain SQLite on the bus host. Do not put secrets in messages; acked messages are deleted after
acked_retention_days.
Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository instead of a public issue.