| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 2.x | Yes |
| 1.x | No |
Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Instead, please report them privately using one of the following methods:
Use GitHub's built-in private reporting:
Send details to the maintainer directly. You can find contact information on the @I4cTime GitHub profile.
When reporting, please provide:
- Description of the vulnerability and its potential impact.
- Steps to reproduce or a proof of concept.
- Affected version(s) of MineUI.
- Environment details (OS, mode - Simple/Advanced, container runtime and version if applicable).
- Suggested fix, if you have one.
| Stage | Timeframe |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement | Within 48 hours |
| Initial assessment | Within 7 days |
| Fix or mitigation | Varies by severity |
| Public disclosure | After a fix is released |
The following areas are in scope for security reports:
- Subprocess execution - command injection via Docker/Podman CLI calls,
the managed Java process (Simple mode), or any other shell-out. All
subprocess calls must build an argv array; shell-string interpolation is
a reportable bug (see
CONTRIBUTING.md§ Scope boundaries). - Server jar download and verification - bypass or weakening of the SHA-1 verification MineUI performs before running an official Minecraft server jar in Simple mode.
- RCON console - command injection or allowlist bypass in the RCON command panel.
- Mods & Plugins - path traversal or unsafe file handling in upload, URL download, or delete flows.
- Configuration editor - path traversal outside the intended
server.properties/config/scope. - World backups - path traversal or archive extraction issues (zip-slip style) in backup create/restore.
- Tauri IPC surface - any command reachable from the frontend that
bypasses intended capability/permission scoping in
src-tauri/capabilities/, or a mismatch betweendocs/v2-contract.mdand the actual IPC implementation that grants excess access. - Container attachment (Advanced mode) - unauthorized access to a container's filesystem or Docker/Podman socket beyond the attached server.
- Container creation (Advanced mode) - argument or environment
injection into the runtime
runcall, the generated RCON password reaching an argv or a log, or the create flow touching a container or volume it did not just create. - Container deletion (Advanced mode) - a container or data volume removed without the explicit confirmed request, a volume removed although only the container was to go, a host folder deleted, or deletion reaching a container other than the one the server points at.
- Server profiles - one profile's commands, events or files reaching
another profile (a
serverIdresolving outsideservers/<id>/, or events delivered under the wrong server). - Secrets and credentials - RCON passwords or other locally stored credentials leaking to logs, disk in plaintext where avoidable, or the frontend bundle.
- Vulnerabilities in upstream dependencies (report those to the respective project).
- Vulnerabilities in the Minecraft server jar itself, or third-party mods/plugins you choose to run.
- Issues requiring physical access to an already-unlocked machine.
- Social engineering attacks.
We're happy to credit security researchers in the release notes and CHANGELOG unless you prefer to remain anonymous. Let us know your preference when reporting.