diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index a6b8c50..b37becf 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ All notable changes to the EthSystems Map are documented here. ## [Unreleased] +- fix(approach): update L1 shielded pool verification gas in [Private Payments](approaches/approach-private-payments.md) ([#222](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/222)) - fix(approach): review of [Private Transaction Broadcasting](approaches/approach-private-broadcasting.md), with a new Private Relay sub-approach. Review of the patterns, vendors and use cases it links. [Threshold-Encrypted Mempool](patterns/pattern-threshold-encrypted-mempool.md) censorship resistance moves from `high` to `medium` ([#213](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/213)). - feat(approach): [Private Institutional Messaging](approaches/approach-private-messaging.md), filling the "Approach TBD" gap on [Private Messaging](use-cases/private-messaging.md), whose recommended-approaches section now links to the card. Compares anchored off-chain messaging (documented, I2I), mixnet-routed messaging (concept) and on-chain encrypted channels (concept), with a 10-row comparison matrix, persona perspectives, a conditional recommendation and open questions. ([#215](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/215)) - feat(use-case): [Private Tokenized Deposits](use-cases/private-tokenized-deposits.md), bank deposits as claims on a shared ledger: payment privacy between banks, the interbank settlement leg, and the link to the core banking system. Linked from [Private Stablecoins](use-cases/private-stablecoins.md), the [Private Payments](approaches/approach-private-payments.md) approach and the [Payments](domains/payments.md) domain. Adds RTGS to the [Glossary](GLOSSARY.md) ([#214](https://github.com/ethsystems/map/pull/214)) diff --git a/approaches/approach-private-payments.md b/approaches/approach-private-payments.md index 55fdca0..1396e1f 100644 --- a/approaches/approach-private-payments.md +++ b/approaches/approach-private-payments.md @@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ example_vendors: [railgun] | Operation | Value | | ------------------ | -------------------------- | -| Gas: deposit | ~155K + ~2.6M verification | -| Gas: transfer | ~181K + ~2.6M verification | -| Gas: withdraw | ~47K + ~2.6M verification | +| Gas: deposit | ~155K + ~694K verification | +| Gas: transfer | ~181K + ~730K verification | +| Gas: withdraw | ~47K + ~712K verification | | Proof gen (client) | 410-991ms | | Trusted setup | No | @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ example_vendors: [] | **CROPS** | CR:hi O:y P:part S:hi | CR:med O:part P:full S:med | CR:med O:part P:full S:med | CR:med O:no P:full S:lo | CR:med O:part P:part S:med | CR:hi O:y P:full S:hi | | **Trust model** | L1 + relayer liveness | Sequencer + bridge | Operator + L1 anchor | TEE vendor + supply chain | Honest-majority MPC | Multi-relay + smartcard + IResilientIdentity | | **Privacy scope** | Anonymity (amounts may leak) | Amounts + counterparties + patterns | Amounts + counterparties (commitments only on chain) | Full inside enclave | Amounts only; counterparties public | Forward-secure + off-ramp unlinkable | -| **Performance** | ~181K + ~2.6M gas / 410-991ms | L2-internal fees | Off-chain transfer / operator-amortized | Variable | MPC overhead, batched | Relay-mediated, mesh-bounded | +| **Performance** | ~181K + ~730K gas / 410-991ms | L2-internal fees | Off-chain transfer / operator-amortized | Variable | MPC overhead, batched | Relay-mediated, mesh-bounded | | **Operator req.** | No (gas relayer optional) | Yes (sequencer) | Yes | Yes (cloud) | Yes (MPC committee) | Yes (relay set with floors) | | **Cost class** | High (L1 verify) | Low | Lowest (amortized) | Variable | Medium | Relay-mediated | | **Regulatory fit** | Strong with viewing keys | Strong with viewing keys | Conditional (operator audit) | Conditional (vendor attestation) | Strong for known-counterparty | Architectural minimization at funder layer | @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ Operate L1 Shielded Payments and Privacy L2 in tiers, bridging via cross-tier me 3. **Operational Recovery.** Dual-key architecture handles balance inspection under cold-storage spending keys; full business continuity workflows and key rotation under shielding are unresolved. 4. **Cross-Jurisdiction Disclosure Standards.** No common selective-disclosure format across MiCA / GENIUS / national regimes. 5. **Traditional Rail Standards.** Technical standards for SWIFT / ISO 20022 integration with privacy infrastructure are emergent. -6. **Verification Gas Viability.** At ~2.6M gas per on-chain verification, the volume threshold above which L2 amortization is mandatory needs measurement per asset class. +6. **Verification Gas Viability.** At ~0.7M gas per on-chain verification, the volume threshold above which L2 amortization is mandatory needs measurement per asset class. 7. **Network Timing Correlation.** Acceptable latency overhead for network-anonymity mitigations is unresolved. 8. **Relay Economic Recovery (Resilient Disbursement Rails).** Commission, L2 settlement, or funder reimbursement each carry distinct privacy consequences; unresolved. 9. **Audit-Friendly View-Key Extension (Resilient Disbursement Rails).** Recipient-derived destinations have no view-key split; can a view-only credential be added without an interactive sender step?