diff --git a/PIMELauncher/src/elevation.rs b/PIMELauncher/src/elevation.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..649776da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PIMELauncher/src/elevation.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/// Whether the launcher should surface the elevation warning for this process.
+///
+/// Only the interactive watchdog instance warns: the worker child inherits the
+/// same token, and a second copy of the warning would be pure noise. A normal
+/// (non-elevated) run must stay silent.
+pub fn should_warn(elevated: bool, is_worker: bool) -> bool {
+    elevated && !is_worker
+}
+
+/// The user-facing explanation shown when the launcher runs elevated.
+///
+/// The two `icacls` lines are the repair from issue #973: an elevated first
+/// run leaves `%APPDATA%\PIME` owned by `BUILTIN\Administrators`, which a
+/// normal session cannot read.
+pub fn elevation_advice() -> &'static str {
+    "PIMELauncher is running as Administrator.\n\
+     \n\
+     PIME stores per-user settings and language profiles under %APPDATA%\\PIME. \
+     Folders created by this elevated run end up owned by Administrators and \
+     become unreadable to your normal session, which silently breaks the input \
+     methods (keys stop composing, with no error anywhere).\n\
+     \n\
+     Quit this instance and restart PIMELauncher as the normal user \u{2014} sign \
+     out and in again, or launch it from a non-elevated terminal.\n\
+     \n\
+     If %APPDATA%\\PIME was already created by an elevated run, repair it from a \
+     normal (non-administrator) command prompt:\n\
+     \n\
+     \x20   icacls \"%APPDATA%\\PIME\" /setowner \"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\" /T\n\
+     \x20   icacls \"%APPDATA%\\PIME\" /reset /T"
+}
+
+/// Whether this process runs with an elevated (Administrator) token.
+///
+/// Reads `TokenElevation` from the process token: under UAC a member of the
+/// Administrators group gets a filtered token whose `TokenIsElevated` is 0,
+/// so this reports the real privilege level rather than group membership.
+pub fn is_process_elevated() -> Result<bool, std::io::Error> {
+    use std::ffi::c_void;
+    use std::mem::size_of;
+    use windows::Win32::Foundation::{CloseHandle, HANDLE};
+    use windows::Win32::Security::{
+        GetTokenInformation, TokenElevation, TOKEN_ELEVATION, TOKEN_QUERY,
+    };
+    use windows::Win32::System::Threading::{GetCurrentProcess, OpenProcessToken};
+
+    unsafe {
+        let mut token = HANDLE::default();
+        OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &mut token)
+            .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(e.code().0))?;
+
+        let mut elevation = TOKEN_ELEVATION::default();
+        let mut returned_length = 0u32;
+        let query = GetTokenInformation(
+            token,
+            TokenElevation,
+            Some(&mut elevation as *mut TOKEN_ELEVATION as *mut c_void),
+            size_of::<TOKEN_ELEVATION>() as u32,
+            &mut returned_length,
+        );
+        // Close the token before propagating a query failure.
+        let _ = CloseHandle(token);
+        query.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(e.code().0))?;
+
+        Ok(elevation.TokenIsElevated != 0)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Logs the elevation warning once, from the watchdog process.
+///
+/// The warning goes to the `warn` log stream, which reaches the launcher's
+/// `/console` window and its `/log-file` sink; a debug log captured while
+/// chasing a "keys do nothing" report (issue #973) then carries the cause.
+pub fn warn_if_elevated(is_worker: bool) {
+    // A failed query must never block the launcher; assume not elevated.
+    let elevated = is_process_elevated().unwrap_or(false);
+    if !should_warn(elevated, is_worker) {
+        return;
+    }
+    let advice = elevation_advice();
+    tracing::warn!("{advice}");
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn only_an_elevated_watchdog_warns() {
+        assert!(should_warn(true, false), "elevated watchdog must warn");
+        assert!(
+            !should_warn(true, true),
+            "worker child must not duplicate the warning"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !should_warn(false, false),
+            "normal sign-in run must stay silent"
+        );
+        assert!(!should_warn(false, true));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn advice_names_the_repair_from_the_issue() {
+        let text = elevation_advice();
+        let lowered = text.to_lowercase();
+        assert!(
+            text.contains("%APPDATA%\\PIME"),
+            "must name the poisoned folder"
+        );
+        assert!(lowered.contains("administrator"), "must name the cause");
+        assert!(lowered.contains("icacls"), "must give the repair commands");
+        assert!(lowered.contains("/setowner"), "must give the ownership fix");
+        assert!(lowered.contains("/reset"), "must give the ACL reset");
+        assert!(
+            lowered.contains("restart"),
+            "must tell the user to relaunch unelevated"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn elevation_query_answers_for_current_process() {
+        // The TokenElevation query must succeed on the test process itself;
+        // the answer depends on how the harness was started, so only the
+        // Ok-ness is asserted.
+        let _elevated = is_process_elevated().expect("TokenElevation query must succeed");
+    }
+}
diff --git a/PIMELauncher/src/lib.rs b/PIMELauncher/src/lib.rs
index d3f5b0f0..44bf5834 100644
--- a/PIMELauncher/src/lib.rs
+++ b/PIMELauncher/src/lib.rs
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ pub mod acl;
 pub mod backend_manager;
 pub mod backend_registry;
 pub mod client_session;
+pub mod elevation;
 pub mod pipe_server;
 pub mod protocol;
 pub mod testing;
diff --git a/PIMELauncher/src/main.rs b/PIMELauncher/src/main.rs
index d544c521..887bab40 100644
--- a/PIMELauncher/src/main.rs
+++ b/PIMELauncher/src/main.rs
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 use pimelauncher::backend_manager::BackendManager;
 use pimelauncher::backend_registry::BackendRegistry;
+use pimelauncher::elevation;
 use pimelauncher::pipe_server;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 use tracing::{error, info, warn};
@@ -241,6 +242,14 @@ async fn main() {
 
     setup_logging(&args);
 
+    // Issue #973: an elevated run poisons %APPDATA%\PIME (owned by
+    // Administrators, unreadable to the normal session). The backend that
+    // creates those folders only starts below, so this is the last point
+    // where the user can still avoid the damage. The worker child inherits
+    // the token; warn_if_elevated stays silent there so the log carries one
+    // warning, not two.
+    elevation::warn_if_elevated(args.is_worker);
+
     // Ensure single instance (using a named mutex)
     // The Watchdog process (parent) holds this mutex.
     let mutex_name = get_per_session_name("PIMELauncher2_WatchdogMutex");